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1 Introduction  
 
As the world’s largest greenhouse gas (GHG) polluter, China’s annual emissions accounted 
for almost 30 per cent of the world’s total emissions in 2014 – more than the United States 
(15 per cent) and the European Union (EU) (10 per cent) combined (World Bank 2015). 
China’s efforts to curb its soaring emissions will play a decisive role in containing 
temperature rise and in preventing the catastrophic consequences of climate change. In 
recent years, the Chinese government has paid greater attention to climate change. 
President Xi Jinping’s attendance at the COP21 conference in Paris was a first by a Chinese 
leader. Before the conference, China’s climate officers submitted the country’s Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) as its formal commitment to the international community to control its 
GHG emissions. In this document, the Chinese government pledges to peak its emissions by 
2030 and promises to try to achieve this goal sooner rather than later. One of the major 
avenues to achieve this target is to increase the share of non-fossil fuel energy in the current 
coal-dominated primary energy mix to reach more than 20 per cent by 2030. The share was 
around 11.1 per cent in 2014 (NDRC 2015a). China’s recently released master plan for 
economic and social development, the 13th Five-Year Plan, also requires this share of non-
fossil fuel to reach 15 per cent by 2020.   
 
The key questions are then whether and how these targets can be met? On the surface, this 
does not seem an over-ambitious target. During China’s 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans 
between 2005 and 2015, the country transformed itself into the largest investor in renewable 
energy sectors in the world. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that between 
2010 and 2015, China contributed more than 40 per cent of the newly installed renewable 
energy capacity around the globe, with its total investment during this period exceeding the 
US and EU combined (IEA 2015). However, this decade of massive wind and solar energy 
development only increased the share of renewable energy to less than 2 per cent of the 
national energy mix by 2014 – casting serious doubt on China’s future plans to decarbonise 
its energy system.   
 
This Evidence Report investigates the changes in China’s wind and solar energy policies, 
and argues that since late 2012 a new policy paradigm has been taking shape within the 
Chinese renewable energy policy community due to a series of external and internal shocks. 
These policy changes will have a tremendous impact on how China is going to further 
develop its renewable energy sector. Renewable energy industries in China are at a critical 
crossroads and are moving towards a new era that contrasts sharply with the previous 
decade, which was characterised by the massive capacity expansion of wind and solar 
farms. A number of emerging external and internal dynamics are affecting both policy 
priorities and process, which have consequently had a tremendous impact on the existing 
institutional arrangements and interest constellations that have developed in the past 
decade. As these policy changes would ultimately affect China’s capability to fulfil its 
emissions reduction pledge at an international level, it is therefore crucial to understand both 
the deep causes of these changes and their implications for the future of China’s renewable 
energy industries.  
 
In this report, wind and solar energy sectors are selected as a case study. The focus on wind 
and solar industries is based on two considerations. First, other non-fossil fuel energies such 
as the hydro power and nuclear power sectors have a long development history in China 
and are therefore governed by rather mature and enclosed policy communities. By contrast, 
newly emergent bureaucratic blocs and non-state actor groups govern the wind and solar 
energy sectors (see Section 2 for a detailed explanation). This emerging policy community 
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has only taken shape in the last decade and is constantly changing to adapt to new actors or 
interests (Shen 2016). Secondly, both large hydro and nuclear power have been subjected 
to constant scrutiny regarding their negative environmental or social impacts, whereas wind 
and solar are often believed to be more sustainable and therefore merit, at least 
theoretically, greater prioritisation for development. However, this is not to suggest that 
hydro and nuclear are irrelevant for China’s energy outlook and politics, as they are indeed 
important segments in its energy system, and their relationship with wind and solar energies 
is a key element of our analysis in later sections.  
 
In order to understand the policy paradigm in the new era we need to go back to the key 
features of institutional arrangements and interest constellations in the previous era. The 
year 2014 is chosen as the line of demarcation because it is believed that a number of 
external and internal shocks happened in that year. Although the development path of the 
wind and solar industries is obviously a continuum, with interests and institutional 
development evolving in a dynamic and non-abrupt fashion, these significant incidents have 
led to significant policy changes when comparing the previous pathway to a new one. The 
signs of such shocks are plenty and will be explained in detail in the later sections of this 
report. Here I would only list notable policy changes. First, quantitative targets of capacity 
expansion in the wind and solar sectors are less common in central policies. In the          
13th Five-Year Plan, such quantitative targets have been totally abandoned and replaced by 
a set of qualitative criteria. Second, policy priorities have shifted to address the problems 
arising from the previous decade of fast, but sometimes reckless, development, such as grid 
connectivity and curtailments. Third, in the previous era large-scale wind farms and solar 
parks were the mainstream activities that accounted for most of the growth in renewable 
energy sectors. But since 2014, the policies are more focused on distributed systems.   
 
This research intends to investigate the factors that have driven these notable policy 
changes since 2014. It is based on primary field investigations between 2014 and 2015, with 
formal interviews and document analysis as the major data collection methods. Altogether 
15 interviews were held with major stakeholders in China’s wind and solar sectors, ranging 
from regulators to business practitioners and consultants. Policy papers are the major 
resource for document analysis with more than 100 policies, measures and laws selected 
and analysed. Particular attention has been given to the elements that are believed to be 
highly relevant to institutional arrangements, power dynamics and interest configurations in 
the renewable energy sectors. The remainder of the report will be divided into five parts. 
Section 2 provides a brief literature review of previous studies regarding China’s renewable 
energy policies. Sections 3 and 4 aim to present the institutional arrangements and interest 
configurations in the previous era. They argue that after a decade-long development, the 
governance structure in China’s renewable energy sector has become increasingly plural, 
with the instrumental interests serving as the glue drawing various actors together as a 
policy community. These instrumental interests refer mainly to economic returns and 
bureaucratic power gained through developing renewable energy activities. Section 5 
provides a detailed account of the external and internal events since 2014 that have been 
producing a profound impact on the policy and market development. Section 6 presents an 
analysis of the major institutional and interests changes that can be noted. Section 7 
concludes with a discussion of the major findings and implications for future study of policy 
coalition and change in China’s renewable energy subsystem.   
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2 Literature review 
 
Almost all types of renewable energy sources have seen breakneck growth in the past 
decade, driving many scholars to believe that a great transformation or energy revolution is 
happening within China (Mathews and Tan 2015). Much academic attention has been paid 
to the tremendous impacts and implications of China’s unprecedented renewable 
development on the international energy outlook, on global competition and on other 
developing countries (ibid.). Others focus on domestic politics and seek to understand the 
drivers behind the massive growth. Some researchers reveal that China’s unique state-led 
governance model plays a significant role (Lewis 2013; Hochstetler and Kostka 2015; Spratt 
2014; Urban and Geall 2014). They noted that Chinese governments at various levels 
developed a series of supportive policies from feed-in tariffs to tax holidays, in order to foster 
technological catch-up and stimulate investment in renewable power generation. 
Consequently, a national ‘championship team’ was developed both in renewable 
manufacturing sectors for wind turbines and solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, and investment 
in power generation facilities such as large-scale grid-connected wind and solar farms. 
 
Other researchers believe that state support is only part of the picture. China’s previous 
state-led efforts for promoting environmental or climate policies often fell into a huge 
implementation gap at local level. However, the success story of renewable energies seems 
to indicate an effective synergy of various interests at local and policy implementation level 
(Harrison and Kostka 2013) when economic, environmental and political interests of various 
actors are combined to deliver promising policy outcomes. Some researchers advance this 
further by arguing that an informal coalition or policy community comprising both public and 
private actors has been taking shape during the fast development of China’s renewable 
energy industries (Shen 2016), which somehow has changed the governance style from a 
typical state-led or top-down approach to a more pluralistic one in past decades (Schmitz 
2016).  
 
As most Western scholars are searching for the answer to China’s renewable energy boom, 
Chinese scholars are looking at the inefficiencies and side effects of a fast-growing 
renewable market and industry. Sufang Zhang and her colleagues are among the first 
Chinese scholars to point out the ‘disconnection’ between China’s renewable energy 
production and manufacturing sector. They argue that, without proper policy coordination 
along the production chain, the mismatch between upstream manufacturing capability for 
turbines or panels and downstream production capacity for power generation would threaten 
the renewable energy industry’s future development (Zhang et al. 2013). Other researchers 
focus on specific issues such as the escalating wind curtailment problems (Zhao et al. 2013), 
which are believed to be the major bottleneck for China’s future wind energy development. 
Zhang and Li (2012) pointed out that, to resolve the curtailment problem, proper incentive 
schemes need to be designed for the grid companies to take renewable energy’s access to 
the grid networks. China has just two grid companies.  
 
Besides this empirical and problem-solving oriented research, Chinese scholars also aim to 
identify the pathways of policy development through historical analysis of the policy change 
and learning process. By adopting the concept of social-technical regime, Zhang, Andrews-
Speed and Ji (2014) argue that the two-decade development of solar PV indicates that 
renewable energy policies have not been as effectively and smoothly carried out as many 
would expect, as many external factors are affecting the policy outcome along with constant 
internal adjustment of policy priority during this period. The literature has revealed the need 
to understand the external and internal dynamics shaping these policy adjustments in a way 
that this report intends to investigate.  
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3 Institutional arrangements and governance 
process 
 
In this section, an institutional analysis is carried out to show the formal governance 
structures and decision-making process for developing renewable investment activities in the 
previous decade. It will also explain how such institutional arrangements were established, 
based on a coalition that has helped China to achieve significant growth in renewable 
investment before 2014. China’s total grid-connected wind energy capacity increased from 
743MW in 2004 to 114.6GW in 2014 (China National Renewable Energy Center 2015). The 
domestic solar energy market was developed at a much later stage in comparison to the 
wind energy sector; however, its total installed capacity also jumped from 820MW in 2010 to 
28.05GW in 2014, making the country the largest wind and solar power investor since 2011. 
Along with the unprecedented market expansion is the constant evolution of regulatory 
institutions to govern the mushrooming renewable investment activities and manufacturing 
facilities around the country. Chinese industrial governance has long been characterised by 
a very fragmented system where different ministries have their very specific regulatory 
territories, and coordination between them is normally inefficient (Mertha 2009). Compared 
to traditional industries, the renewable energy sector has a relatively simplified governance 
structure (see Figure 3.1). At present, four ministry-level entities are directly involved in 
regulating the development of the renewable energy industries. On the surface, there is a 
seemingly clear role-sharing scheme among these entities. For example, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and its National Energy Administration 
(NEA) are responsible for overseeing, planning and regulating all the renewable energy 
investment activities in China. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) is 
responsible for overseeing and regulating all the manufacturing activities in the renewable 
energy sectors. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is responsible for collecting, budgeting and 
monitoring the ‘Renewable Energy Development Fund’, which is the core subsidy 
programme for supporting the development of renewable energy projects. As for the 
overseas wind and solar projects, formal approvals need to be acquired from both NDRC 
and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).   
 
This governance model, involving four powerful ministries regarding various aspects of 
renewable energy industries, is a reflection of how China’s energy subsystem has been 
governed in the past decade – and of the trend towards fragmenting governance institutions 
so that institutional conflicts can be avoided when each ministry has a territory to govern. 
Such fragmentation has long been noted by scholars of the Chinese political system (Yang 
2004), and is often believed to be a source of confusion and contradictions among the 
policies and a reason why coordination and efficiency are lacking (Breslin 2007). However, 
in the renewable energy sectors, it should be noted that the decision-making power of these 
governing institutions is not evenly distributed, and therefore, as this report found, the 
contradictory policies are rarely found. The most influential institution among all these 
governing authorities is the NEA, which is part of the NDRC, a powerful macroeconomic 
management agency under the Chinese State Council, with broad administrative and 
planning control over the Chinese economy.  
 
A merger of the former State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) in 2013 has 
reinforced the current NEA, under the NDRC. Before being abolished, SERC’s governance 
domain mainly resided in monitoring how power generation markets were run and in setting 
various operational standards. The merger significantly enhanced the NEA’s political status 
and governance capabilities, helping it to become the dominant institution for regulating the 
energy subsystem, including the renewable energy segment among other ministries in 
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Beijing. The NEA’s Renewable Energy Department is the direct authority for regulating 
renewable energy investment and approvals of project development around the country. 
Until recently, the annual and total installed capacity of renewable energy generation has 
been treated as the single most important indicator to evaluate the progress of renewable 
energy sectors. Clearly specified capacity targets are enshrined in China’s domestic and 
international political agenda. For example, the 12th Five-Year Plan (between 2010 and 
2015) set a target for total wind energy capacity of 100GW by 2015 (already achieved). The 
NEA also set a target of 15GW for solar PV instalment in 2015, a single year. 
 
Since the installed capacity of renewable energy has been viewed as the most important 
indicator, and since capacity increase largely depends on investment in large-scale grid-
connected wind and solar farms, the regulators of these project development and investment 
activities have consequently become the most powerful institutions among all the governing 
entities. Those who regulate the manufacturing facilities (MIIT) and subsidy programmes 
(MOF) are instead playing a supportive role in the governance system. Such an 
arrangement has a tremendous advantage because within a single target system, various 
actors can be relatively easily organised into a powerful alliance to pursue the same goal 
(Shen 2016). China’s unprecedented progress in terms of capacity increase in its wind and 
solar sectors owes much to this institutional arrangement. Almost all the institutions and 
decision-making processes are designed to make sure that the quantitative targets are met. 
Meanwhile, other interests or appeals not directly related to capacity accumulation are often 
viewed by the regulators as less urgent and consequently are set aside.  
Figure 3.1 Governing institutions of China’s renewable energy sector: 
vertical and horizontal links 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own. 
 
A typical example of this is the delay in paying renewable subsidies to the project investors. 
This has become a constant pattern due to the fast expansion of the renewable energy 
sectors. In an interview, one solar power farm owner complained: 
 
Our subsidy payment has been delayed for over a year now. But this is a normal 
phenomenon. Some investors waited for more than two years to get it. The problem 
is that there is no specific entity responsible for the delay of payment. All ministries 
claim that they are not responsible [for the late payment]. We can do nothing but 
wait. 
(Interviewee no. 13, December 2015) 
The State Council 
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8 
 
It is estimated that the total overdue subsidy payment for solar investment could be as high 
as 20bn to 30bn yuan RMB (US$3.2bn to US$4.8bn) in 2015 (China Electricity Council 
2015). This is mainly because renewable subsidy is collected as a renewable additional 
charge from the energy end users, which has become increasingly inadequate due to the 
fast expansion of renewable activities around the country. Although the MOF as the funding 
‘manager’ has issued several measures (Ministry of Finance 2012, 2015) to ensure 
payments are collected from end users via the grid companies, the insufficiency is still as 
high as 50 per cent. Being a central budgeting ministry, the MOF has very limited influence 
both at the energy supply and energy consumption side (see Section 4 for a detailed 
explanation). It therefore denies responsibility for the delay in subsidy payments because it 
believes that the inadequacies of the funding system are far beyond its own control and 
regulatory power.  
 
The case of delayed subsidy payments underlines a crucial challenge for the NEA-
dominated co-governance arrangement – how to properly motivate those supporting 
ministries since their preferences or administrative power are sometimes contained and 
overlooked (see Section 4). In addition, most of these supportive ministries do not gain any 
immediate benefit from a growing market. This challenge is particularly pertinent at the local 
level where local officers are hugely demotivated if they are excluded from decision-making 
regarding individual investment activities. One solution is to share the decision-making 
authority among various institutions both at central and local levels, but such a balancing 
approach would almost inevitably lead to a very complicated process for renewable project 
development, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. It is clear that local entities play a significant role in 
determining the fate of investment activities within their political purview. In the past decade, 
the consent of both county and provincial-level governments has been a prerequisite for 
developing any wind or solar farms.  
 
It should be noted that the institutional arrangement for project approvals has been modified 
several times in the past decade and the current process was legitimised only in 2012. 
Previously, the NEA decided to retain central control over the power to approve projects 
because delegating such power to the local governments had led to a disorganised 
development of project activities before 2010. However, the decision to keep control of 
project approval in Beijing since 2010 has led to a sharp contraction of the market. This 
forced the NEA to return approval back to local governments in 2012, as illustrated in Figure 
3.2. The struggle between central and local governments regarding project approval rights 
highlights an issue that has long haunted China’s political system, namely that power 
delegation to local level often leads to market disorder which, in turn, leads to tighter control 
from Beijing and, consequently, stagnation (一放就乱，一管就死, meaning disorder follows 
delegation, stagnation follows centralisation). A vicious circle of power delegation and power 
control has been occurring throughout the years of governance. The current decision-making 
process in the renewable energy sectors indicates a new approach to address this problem. 
It could be described as a ‘centrally coordinated bottom-up’ process, where central 
government still controls the governance functions such as overall planning and target 
setting, and local governments are given more autonomy to decide each project’s fate 
according to their own preferences. It is believed that this arrangement is playing a central 
role in reining in the reckless expansion without hurting local enthusiasm for attracting 
renewable investments.  
 
Although the policymaking system of renewable energy projects is both horizontally and 
vertically fragmented, the core interests shared by the main actors can be noted during the 
interviews conducted. This is illustrated in the following sections. 
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Figure 3.2 Key stages for wind farm project approval  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own, based on interviews with wind farm project managers. 
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4 Developing renewable energy sectors: a 
common goal out of fragmented interests 
 
The previous section presented the institutional arrangements and decision-making 
processes for developing renewable energy industries and investment activities. It is clear 
that in China the development of wind and solar industries is sustained by a coalition 
including multiple administrative entities at central and local levels, and state-owned and 
private companies as investors and manufacturers. Consequently, tremendous coordination 
efforts are needed during the implementation of individual wind or solar project investments. 
Each party has its own instrumental interests to pursue in wind or solar activities, so making 
sure everyone gets what they want is crucial for the continuous development of renewable 
energy industries. 
  
In this section, the various instrumental interests are discussed in detail. Purdon (2015) 
points out that in the climate governance domain, various interests are often reflected in the 
tensions between political and economic objectives, and in the trade-offs between long-term 
and immediate benefits. China’s renewable energy industry is a typical example of how 
these tensions are embedded within the complex governance structures. However, it should 
be noted that fragmentation of interests in the renewable industries is inevitable because this 
industry is by nature multipurpose-driven – each actor has only a limited interest in the 
environmental, political and economic benefits that renewable energy offers. Chinese 
leaders view renewable energy not just as having climate benefits, but also having multiple 
strategic values as part of its development. At the outset, as a country that heavily imports 
energy resources, locally produced energy resources such as wind and solar would enhance 
China’s energy security and energy independence. Geopolitically, it would also help to 
reduce the competition or friction with other major energy importing countries (Jiang 2006; 
Salameh 1995; Zweig and Bi 2005). Renewable energy is also believed to be useful in 
relieving the air pollution problems in many cities around China, where heavy smog has 
become the biggest worry and source of discontent for many citizens, hence a social 
problem (Ho and Edmonds 2007). Lastly, renewable energy as a ‘sunrise’ industry provides 
comparatively equal opportunities for Chinese companies and technologies to compete with 
Western companies on the same level. For a country that is desperately upgrading its 
inefficient industrial system to achieve industrial modernisation, there is a convincing 
possibility of ‘cutting the corner’ to catch up with advanced industrial countries thanks to 
massive investment in this emerging sector (Lema and Lema 2012; Mathews 2007). 
Therefore, development of the renewable energy sector has tremendous political value for 
the political leaders in Beijing. 
 
The environmental benefits of renewable energy, by replacing the high-polluting, high-
emission fossil fuel system, provide the fundamental drive and strong rationale that 
government officers need to support its development. Locally produced renewable energy 
such as wind and solar need no minerals from abroad, and therefore is crucial to relieve 
China’s growing reliance on energy imports, enhancing energy security and independence. 
For Chinese leaders, the advancement of renewable energy industries would also help the 
country to claim a commanding position in the global energy future. Economically, 
investment in wind and solar farms and the development of manufacturing capacity would 
produce significant economic benefits for the localities that host these activities, often in 
terms of employment and tax income. As a result, all these pragmatic interests are 
intertwined in the massive development of the renewable industries. 
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Many previous studies on China’s renewable energy policies or politics have noted the 
diversity of interests within this sector (Dai 2015). But the analytical focus is often given to 
understanding the rival interests in the central–local or state–private actor nexus (in other 
words, it focuses on the contrasted interests along the vertical chain presented in Figure 
3.1). This focus arguably overlooks the varied interests among the entities or actor groups at 
the same horizontal (central, local and business) level, suggesting that actors belonging to 
the same category would have the same interests. This report argues that central ministries, 
local regulators or business communities should not be stereotyped as having only a single 
set of interests. Instead, our field study and interviews reveal that actors within the same 
horizontal cluster vary significantly in terms of their priorities or preferences regarding 
renewable energy development. Different regulatory ministries in Beijing may have highly 
contrasted interests in developing wind or solar energy projects, and similar contrasts can 
also be found within the local regulatory system and business communities. 
  
Based on the stakeholder interviews and analysis of the policy documents, Table 4.1 aims to 
present the configuration of major interests and objectives in China’s renewable energy and 
the key actors who are endorsing these interests. It is noted that most of the entities involved 
in the governance structure and process possess multiple rather than single interests, 
particularly at the central level. NEA and MIIT officers in Beijing often hold political, economic 
and environmental objectives simultaneously. This is hardly surprising as most of these 
ministries have a wide range of duties compared to local regulators and profit-making 
business organisations. The interests of local or business entities appear to focus on short-
term industrial or economic benefits. However, given the highly diversified interests among 
the key actors, the expansion of renewable energy investment and energy generation 
capacities emerged as the most popular goal because it meets the multiple interests held by 
most of the actors (Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1  Interests configuration of China’s renewable energy sectors  
Clusters of 
long-term 
interests 
Leading 
role in 
international 
climate 
negotiations 
Enhancing 
energy 
security and 
achieving 
energy 
independence 
Reducing 
pollution 
and 
carbon 
emissions 
Building a 
world-leading 
renewable 
energy 
technology 
and 
manufacturing 
industry 
Boosting wind 
and solar 
farms 
investment for 
economic 
growth 
Enhancing 
operational 
safety and 
financial 
viability of 
renewable 
energy 
markets   
Short-term 
interests and 
goals 
Fulfilling 
China’s 
pledge of 
achieving 
20% non-
fossil fuels 
in energy 
mix 
Reducing 
energy 
imports and 
enhancing 
locally 
produced 
energy 
Generating 
green 
electricity 
to 
substitute 
fossil fuel 
power 
Nurturing 
technology 
and 
manufacturing 
leaders; 
managing 
production 
capacity 
Encouraging 
more project 
investment 
and 
manufacturing 
facilities   
Safety of 
grid 
operation, 
relief from 
financial 
stress due 
to heavy 
subsidies  
State Council ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
NEA of NDRC ↑ ↑  ↑ ↑ ↑ 
MIIT    ↑ ↑ ↑ 
MOF     ↓ ↑ 
MOFCOM    ↑   
Provincial 
leaders 
    ↑  
Local NDRC     ↑ ↑ 
(Cont’d). 
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Table 4.1  (Cont’d). 
Clusters of 
long-term 
interests 
Leading 
role in 
international 
climate 
negotiations 
Enhancing 
energy 
security and 
achieving 
energy 
independence 
Reducing 
pollution 
and 
carbon 
emissions 
Building a 
world-leading 
renewable 
energy 
technology 
and 
manufacturing 
industry 
Boosting wind 
and solar 
farms 
investment for 
economic 
growth 
Enhancing 
operational 
safety and 
financial 
viability of 
renewable 
energy 
markets   
Short-term 
interests and 
goals 
Fulfilling 
China’s 
pledge of 
achieving 
20% non-
fossil fuels 
in energy 
mix 
Reducing 
energy 
imports and 
enhancing 
locally 
produced 
energy 
Generating 
green 
electricity 
to 
substitute 
fossil fuel 
power 
Nurturing 
technology 
and 
manufacturing 
leaders; 
managing 
production 
capacity 
Encouraging 
more project 
investment 
and 
manufacturing 
facilities   
Safety of 
grid 
operation, 
relief from 
financial 
stress due 
to heavy 
subsidies  
Local MIIT    ↑ ↑  
Local MOF      ↑ 
Local 
MOFCOM 
   ↑   
Project 
investor 
    ↑  
Manufacturers    ↑ ↑  
Financiers     ↑  
Grid 
companies 
    ↓ ↑ 
 
At the central level, many key regulatory entities wish to see fast-expanding wind and solar 
investment activities across the country, because the installed capacity for renewable energy 
can be a major quantitative indicator of their performance against policymakers in other 
policy segments. It is also the most direct way of achieving the political target of 20 per cent 
non-fossil fuel energy in the national energy mix by 2030 at a macro level. As the direct 
authority, the NEA and its local officers would benefit tremendously if such targets were met. 
At the micro level, the approval of individual renewable investments also conveys significant 
bureaucratic power to its officers. The MIIT, as another powerful central institution 
responsible for supervising industrial activities, also shares this goal with NEA officers 
because the growth of equipment manufacturing sectors largely depends on the growth of 
upstream investments in power generation facilities. The only slight difference is that wind 
energy is a domestic-oriented market from the start (Xu, He and Zhao 2010) so the alliance 
between turbine manufacturers, wind farm developers and their regulators including the MIIT 
and NDRC can be traced back for a decade. However, for the solar industry, before 2010 its 
manufacturing capability had been mainly serving export and overseas markets. Domestic 
solar farms only emerged after overseas markets slumped in 2011 and 2012, due to several 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations and charges brought against Chinese solar 
products by the EU and the US (Lewis 2014). The State Council and the NDRC introduced 
ambitious feed-in tariff systems in 2013 to help the domestic market take off (State Council 
2013; NDRC 2013a). The sudden shift towards domestic solar capacity expansion also 
changed the interest configuration within both the policy and business communities 
tremendously. The interviewees from solar industries indicate that prior to 2012, the MIIT 
and MOFCOM were their major contacting ministries as they were responsible for 
manufacturing and trade policy design and making. Now it seems that the NEA has taken 
over as the leading governing entity of the development of the solar energy industry, both for 
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macro-level planning and micro-level project approvals, just as it does with the wind energy 
industry. 
 
Since Shuangfan [or 双反, meaning the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy charges], our 
only hope to avoid total collapse of this industry is the fast expansion of the domestic 
solar market. NEA’s planning and supportive policy for this industry, such as annual 
solar instalment targets and feed-in tariff, determines our survival. How can we 
ignore them? 
(Interviewee no. 4, August 2014)  
 
It is noted that the MIIT as the former chief governing entity fully realises the importance of 
the domestic market for the survival of the manufacturing industries that it supervises, so 
there is hardly any friction in this power transition from the MIIT to the NEA. However, the 
MIIT remains the main regulator for the turbine and panels manufacturing facilities, which 
are a popular interest cluster (Table 4.1). Technology innovation and manufacturing 
capability are deemed by Chinese leaders to be the crucial objective of developing a world-
leading renewable energy sector (Lewis 2013). At the initial stages of market development 
between 2004 and 2007, protectionists and favourable policies were designed to protect 
China’s newly emerged manufacturing sectors from strong foreign competitors (Lewis 2013; 
NDRC 2005). However, most of these protectionist policies have been gradually phased out 
since 2010 after Chinese wind turbine and solar PV manufacturers overtook foreign 
competitors and dominated the domestic markets.  
 
Today, the priorities of the renewable manufacturing sector are twofold and, in a way, 
conflicting. On the one hand, according to the policies announced by the MIIT, it aims to 
cultivate world-leading manufacturers of wind turbines and solar PVs in China (MIIT 2012). 
On the other, it also aims to curb the over-capacity problems that threaten the future of 
Chinese renewable manufacturing industries (MIIT 2013, 2014). For example, the overall 
production capacity of solar PV panels in China is estimated to exceed 43GW in 2015 while 
the annual global total installed capacity is only around 55GW, including 15GW being 
installed in China (China Photovoltaic Industry Association 2016). Therefore, it is estimated 
that more than 50 per cent of production capacities remained idle in 2015, and this over-
capacity problem cannot be resolved by domestic investment in solar farms. The significant 
elimination of existing production capacity is inevitable. However, shutting down the local 
manufacturing facilities can be politically difficult as local governments are, in general, 
reluctant to do so for fear of provoking social unrest and economic loss. Even the MIIT’s 
local branches are following their Beijing headquarters’ request wholeheartedly for fear of 
offending their local provincial or municipal leaders, who are their immediate superiors in the 
hierarchical bureaucratic system. Consequently, the expansion of investment capacity is a 
more realistic solution – arguably the only solution. Such conflicts are not unusual in China’s 
central–local politics, and the vertical decision chain is jeopardised by local compartmental 
politics and interests, often referred to as ‘tiaokuai’ (条块) in China (Breslin 2007). In the 
renewable energy sectors, it seems that such vertical-compartment conflicts are obvious in 
manufacturing, which partly explains why alliances or alignments of interests are achieved 
more easily around expanding renewable investment where such conflicts are less common.  
 
Another interest cluster that has become increasingly popular among stakeholders relates to 
the operation and maintenance challenges of wind and solar farms. The massive 
development of the wind and solar energy sectors in the past few years has produced 
serious maintenance, coordination and financial problems. First, it has been found hard to 
connect some renewable energy to the grid. Even where it is, the power generation is often 
curtailed by the grid companies, mainly due to the limited grid accommodation capacity 
(NDRC 2013b, 2014). As the curtailment grows each year along with the fast expansion of 
wind and solar investment across the country, it has become the biggest concern of most 
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stakeholders interviewed during our field investigation. As one interviewee from the local 
State Grid Corporation put it:  
 
Previously when curtailment happens, we grid companies are often denounced as 
not supporting clean energy development. But now the consensus has been reached 
that nothing can be done by the grid companies in the short run, unless large-scale 
investment is equally poured into the grid infrastructure construction rather than just 
invest in power generation facilities such as wind and solar farms. But it is difficult 
because wind and solar farms have government subsidies, so there is a strong 
commercial interest in it. Grid expansion relies on our own budget allocated by the 
central state annually. There will always be a gap between commercial investment 
and state investment. 
(Interviewee no. 2, August 2014) 
 
Faced by this difficult situation, the State Grid is a hesitant supporter of further expansion of 
renewable energy production. But it is not the only institution that feels negative side effects 
of the massive investment in wind and solar farms. Since 2012, the MOF has been 
appointed by the State Council to become the managing institution of the renewable energy 
fund, responsible for collecting additional fees from electricity consumers and distributing 
them to the wind and solar power producers in the form of a subsidy. For most of the wind 
and solar investors this subsidy payment is ‘living stock’ because it is the most important 
source of profitability. Rampant market expansion would inevitably exacerbate the deficiency 
of the renewable energy fund and further delay subsidy payments. The MOF is therefore 
arguing for a more sensible development plan for renewable energy investment and a more 
effective subsidy system for renewable energy investment.   
  
The field investigation also illustrated that besides key actors such as the NEA, MIIT and 
MOF, other central and local regulators have a rather ambivalent attitude towards most non-
economic interests (represented as the blank slots in Table 4.1). For example, as the 
ministry responsible for foreign trade and overseas investment activities, MOFCOM’s major 
interest is to resolve the trade dispute with other countries so that foreign markets can be 
reopened to Chinese exporters. Hence, developing domestic markets, either through 
manufacturing, power generation or operational maintenance, has little relevance for 
MOFCOM’s core interests. In addition, since no environmental or climate regulators are 
involved at any level of the governance system in the renewable energy sectors, there is an 
obvious under-representation of pro-environment and pro-climate interests across all layers 
of the current governance system, even though the renewable industry is presumably aimed 
at addressing environmental issues first and foremost. Our field investigation indicates that 
none of the entities, probably with the exception of the State Council at the top of the 
decision chain, are promoting renewable energy activities specifically for these activities’ 
environmental benefits. This is in sharp contrast to the popularity of economic benefits, 
particularly through the massive scale of investment in wind and solar farms, which are 
endorsed by the majority of the entities across the levels.  
 
The interest analysis reveals several insights. First, multiple interests exist among various 
actors, meaning that most of the actors involved in the renewable energy development are 
not necessarily climate or environmentally conscious but are looking for instrumental 
benefits from the market or industrial development. Second, the fragmentation of interests 
may not be a hindrance for rapid market development, as long as each party gets what it 
wants during the process. The rapid expansion of large-scale wind and solar farms allows 
central governments to meet their target and outperform their regulatory competitors; it 
promises profit returns for the investors; provides new and lifesaving business opportunities 
for manufacturers; and helps local governments in remote areas to develop their economies. 
Killing several birds with one stone is the reason behind China’s phenomenal expansion of 
renewable energy industries. However, this is not to say that there are no conflicting 
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interests within these fragmented interest clusters; particularly, the rising difficulties of 
connecting to the grid represent a popular new concern that, as many key actors are 
convinced, needs to be addressed as a priority. It is argued that such conflicts, along with a 
number of external shocks, are changing the policy agenda and actors’ preferences in 
China’s renewable energy sectors tremendously.       
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5 The changing contexts for renewable energy 
development since 2014 
 
So far, we have shown how the institutional arrangements and interest configurations of the 
previous era emerged from the rapid renewable energy development of the past decade. 
This development era is characterised as an emerging policy coalition with diversified 
interests but a synergised policy priority of expanding power generation capacities via large-
scale wind and solar farms. However, this coalition and its policy priority have been 
undermined by a series of external and internal shocks.  
5.1 A slowing economy and dwindling energy demand 
The biggest external shock is China’s economy, which has been running out of steam since 
2014. After 30 years of stunning economic growth, the pace of economic development has 
decelerated from an annual growth rate of more than 10 per cent before 2008 to around       
7 per cent until recently. The slowing economy, often officially referred to as a ‘new normal’ 
(‘xinchangtai’ or新常态) after President Xi came into power in 2013, is prompting many 
structural changes within society. One is a sharp drop in demand for electricity due to 
weaker production activities of heavy industries such as coal, cement, steel and metallurgy. 
In 2014, the annual total energy consumption increased only by 3.8 per cent, a record low 
since 1998. In the first three quarters of 2015, this figure continued to fall to 0.8 per cent. The 
annual increase in energy consumption is estimated at below 1 per cent, a record low since 
1974. In the meantime, the total newly installed power generation capacity increased by     
9.4 per cent. The accumulation speed on the supply side far exceeds the demand side. As a 
result, the average utilisation hours for electricity generation facilities in the power plants fell 
from 2,972 hours to 2,740 hours, indicating that a large amount of power generation capacity 
is falling idle compared to the previous year. A severe over-supply issue is emerging among 
China’s state-owned power utilities, which is changing the interest configuration of China’s 
energy system tremendously, including the wind and solar energy segments. 
 
As previously explained, over the past two decades, China’s renewable sector has 
developed in a rather enclosed sub-political system and this development remains largely 
undisturbed by the traditional fossil fuel-dominant energy system. This was mainly because 
the fast-growing demand of electricity to fuel the red-hot economy required all forms of 
energy supply regardless of its origin. One of the unique points of China’s renewable energy 
development is the lack of resistance and harassment from the so-called ‘electricity 
incumbents’ of traditional energy industries or policy communities often found in other fossil 
fuel-dominant countries (Baker 2015; Baker, Newell and Phillips 2014). In general, 
renewable energy did not develop at the expense of fossil fuel energy and that is the real 
reason why these newly emergent energy sources developed in such a peaceful and 
enthusiastic way. Yet the political climate surrounding the incumbent fossil fuel power 
generation disappeared when energy demand hit a ceiling. The peaceful co-existence of the 
previous era is now being replaced by emerging competition and energy over-supply due to 
the economic downturn. As one interviewed wind farm developer said anxiously: 
 
In the past, although on the surface renewables and thermal power stations were 
developing in parallel, in reality we all knew renewables were dependent on thermal 
or even in a way at its mercy. By law [Renewable Energy Law enacted in 2005], most 
of the state-owned utilities have a renewable energy quota that they have to meet in 
order to build up more thermal power stations. Therefore it is fair to say that without 
the development of thermal power sectors there will be no renewables development. 
(Interviewee no. 12, December 2015) 
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But besides fossil fuel energy incumbents, there are other competitors from the non-fossil 
fuel segments, particularly from the nuclear energy sector. China’s ambition to develop this 
sector was thwarted by the Fukushima accident in 2011, but it regained its momentum in 
2014. China is currently the largest constructor of nuclear reactors in the world, with total 
capacities under construction of 28.5GW in 2015. Most of these projects will be completed 
around 2020, achieving 60GW generation capacity by then (Guo and Guo 2016; Zeng et al. 
2016). Besides massive construction of nuclear reactors, the discourse around nuclear 
energy has been significantly elevated, describing it as a form of clean energy that is crucial 
for economic development, enhancing the energy mix, and improving people’s living 
standards. Such discourse is surprisingly identical to that previously developed to promote 
wind and solar energies. The State Council and other government entities are increasingly 
endorsing such discourse, showing their commitment to supporting this industry. The strong 
emergence of the nuclear industry will almost inevitably further reduce the space for 
renewable energy in years to come.  
 
In general, since the beginning of economic reform in the early 1980s, the shortage of 
energy supply to power the fast-growing economy has been a major worry for Chinese 
leaders and energy regulators. All the regulatory priorities and institutional arrangements 
were therefore designed to guarantee the energy supply and avoid power shortages. Now, 
for the first time, this major challenge is largely resolved, making it inevitable that shrinking 
energy demand will force a rebalancing of interests among the various energy sources. This 
in turn will eventually shape the institutions around energy governance, including renewable 
energies.  
5.2 Over-capacity and curtailments in renewable energy sectors 
The increasing competition between different sources of the energy supply has exacerbated 
the problem of curtailments on wind and solar energy production in 2014 and 2015. This is 
because grid companies often prefer thermal and other forms of energy output to be 
connected to the networks. According to the NEA, the average operational hour for wind 
turbines hit a record low of 1,728 hours/year in 2015 (world average is 3,000 hours/year), 
and 15 per cent of the wind capacities were forced to remain idle (NEA 2015b). In some 
northern provinces like Jilin, Xijiang and Gansu, the grid curtailed more than 30 per cent of 
the capacities (Figure 5.1). These forced curtailments have become the biggest threat to the 
survival of the wind energy sector.  
 
Previously, curtailments were mainly regarded as a technological issue. The development 
speed of wind and solar farms outpaced the development speed of the grid connection and 
accommodation capacity, so grid companies were not capable of taking large amounts of 
wind and solar energies into the grid system. However, the field investigation reveals that 
there are more deeply rooted political causes for these curtailments. At the heart of the 
problem is a divergence of political interests and understanding among the stakeholders 
regarding the environmental, political and economic values of renewable energy. In past 
decades, encouraged by the Renewable Energy Law and other favourable policies, local 
government treated renewable energy activities as a new engine for economic growth, while 
companies tried to seize the opportunity to grab the renewable resources and the early 
market entrant advantage for future competition. The result, as illustrated in the previous 
sections, was the swift concentration of interests towards the short-term economic value of 
investing in renewable energy projects. As many previous studies on China’s renewable 
energy policies and politics have shown, various forms of government support are believed 
to have been the major factor for China achieving such stunning growth in its renewable 
energy sectors (Lewis 2013).  
 
However, this research suggests there were some side effects to relentless government 
support, particularly those measures driven purely by short-term economic benefits at the 
18 
 
local level. In many local provinces it has been found that local government gave the land for 
project construction to project developers for free, that income tax from the projects was 
generously exempted, and that all the local regulatory supervision was carried out in a slack 
manner only to attract more investment into the locality. These ‘supportive’ measures 
distorted the market and price signals of renewable energy investment and created a 
significant over-capacity problem, which eventually sparked an unprecedented slew of 
curtailments and output controls on wind and solar energy.  
Figure 5.1 The curtailments of wind energy production in 2015 
 
 
Source: Author’s own, based on data from NEA (2015a). 
 
The worsening situation since 2014 indicates that the problems are far more complicated 
than just an overheated market. It is increasingly clear that local governments, once so 
fervent in promoting investment activities in the renewable energy sectors, are turning their 
backs now the crisis has come. Some local governments give preference to rescuing 
thermal power, which often represents larger economic and social benefits, such as 
employment and turnovers, than wind and solar farms. Some provinces such as Yunnan, 
Gansu and Xinjiang even issued measures to request that part of profits be transferred from 
renewable energy project owners to thermal power stations, if they want to maintain their 
connection to the grid. Such local measures obviously conflict with the Renewable Energy 
Law which requires that all power generation by renewable energy facilities is purchased 
unconditionally by the grid companies.   
 
Before you invest, they [the local governments] gave you all sorts of promises: land, 
tax free, clearances and permits, etc. But when your investment got underway, you 
were then told that they would not help you selling the electricity – worse than that, 
Inner Mongolia 18% 
Gansu 39% 
Xinjiang 19–32% 
Heilongjiang 21% 
Jilin 32% 
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you have to give way to fossil fuel power, which is essentially violating the 
Renewable Energy Law which guarantees the priority status of renewable energy to 
be purchased. 
(Interviewee no. 8, December 2014)  
 
One interviewee from the wind industry associations referred to these newly emergent local 
pro-thermal measures as a ‘stabbing in the back’, but admitted that this could be just the 
beginning as the energy over-supply has become a ‘new normal’. 
5.3 Electricity reform 
Since 2014, Chinese central government decided to advance the long-halted electricity 
reform. The State Council issued guidelines in March 2015 as a landmark policy to kick off 
the reforms (State Council 2015). The fundamental objective of this round of electricity 
reform is to break up the monopolistic status of grid companies whose responsibility extends 
from transportation and distribution to the sales of electricity to all the industrial, commercial 
and household users across the country. In 2013, the overall income of China’s grid 
companies account for 3.6 per cent of total gross domestic product (GDP) (Financial Times 
China 2014), making it a mammoth entity and interest group that could deter marketised 
price reform of electricity over the past decade. The immediate goal of the new reform is to 
open up the electricity sales market for other companies so that they can purchase energy 
directly from the energy producers and sell it to the energy end-users.  
 
It is obvious that such reform would take years to be implemented due to its complexity and 
possible strong resistance from existing interest groups. But it will surely have a mixed 
impact on the development of renewable energy industries. The marketised price system is 
theoretically in favour of renewable energy as government subsidy would make renewable 
electricity more competitive in comparison with fossil fuel electricity. However, the notorious 
overdue payment of government subsidies may in reality significantly demotivate power 
purchasing entities from buying electricity from renewable power generation facilities. 
Therefore, new mechanisms for renewable subsidy and fund collection are crucial to 
maintain renewable energy’s competitiveness. Previously, grid companies collected all of the 
additional renewable charges from energy end-users and handed them over to the MOF, 
which was responsible for distribution to the renewable energy producers. This system is 
highly inefficient and time-consuming. If the subsidy can be collected directly by the energy 
purchaser from the energy end-users then the competitiveness of renewable energies will be 
significantly enhanced ahead of other non-subsidised energy sources. On the contrary, if the 
subsidy has to be collected and redistributed via government agencies then the high 
transaction cost and bureaucratic risks would put renewable energies in a highly 
disadvantaged position. 
 
The reform would also encourage the development of a distributed solar and wind energy 
system and locally consumed renewable energy facilities. Since 2013, how to promote the 
distributed solar power system has become a big challenge for Chinese regulators. Although 
various policies are designed to promote this segment, the progress made by the distributed 
solar system has been far below the development trajectory forecast for the past few years 
(NEA 2013a, 2014a; Shen 2016). One of the reasons for the slow progress is that major 
stakeholders, such as state utilities, banks or grid companies, are largely reluctant to 
develop distributed projects due to the minimum economic benefits associated with them. 
However, the reforms may allow surplus power from the distributed system to be sold to the 
independent power purchasing entities rather than to the grid companies. This would 
significantly reduce the transaction cost, as locally based power purchasers could take the 
surplus energy and resell it to local end-users through local distribution channels via the 
local grid. In the long run, such a local community-based energy system would be much 
more efficient than the current centrally planned transmission and distribution system, which 
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relies on very costly super high-voltage and long-distance transmission lines. A flexible and 
localised energy system will surely enhance the competitiveness of renewables, which will 
be explained in detail in the next sections.  
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6 Recent policy changes and the future of 
Chinese renewable energy sectors  
 
In the previous section, the exogenous factors are shown to illustrate the fundamental 
economic and political changes in the environment surrounding renewable energy industries. 
The slowing down of economic growth since 2014, the worsening over-capacity problems 
and the intensified competition among all forms of energy supply, plus the uncertainties 
associated with the ongoing electricity reforms, present unprecedented challenges for the 
future development of the renewable energy industries. It is noted that these exogenous 
shocks have sparked a number of internal struggles that pave the way for necessary policy 
adjustment and changes. Since 2014, the policy paradigms of renewable energy 
development have been undergoing significant changes as a consequence of these 
exogenous shocks. 
6.1 A contested paradigm shift  
At the outset, it is noted that there has been a gradual lessening of emphasis on the 
continuous expansion of renewable energy capacity in the energy mix. Capacity expansion 
is known as the most important policy goal and popular interest shared by most of the 
stakeholders in the past decade. Before 2014, most of the wind and solar policies were 
designed to meet the quantitative annual instalment target set by the NEA. The interviews 
with the wind and solar farm investors indicate that most of these companies are also using 
annual instalment capacity, instead of other common indicators for profit-oriented business 
such as investment returns or profitability, as their most important criteria to evaluate their 
business performance. This is often referred to by the interviewees as the ‘bigger the better’ 
strategy. But it has been gradually replaced as policymakers realised that the size of the 
market or the share of renewables in the energy mix is no longer the most crucial factor for 
future development. It is noted that for wind energy development the quantitative targets for 
annual instalment have become increasingly less important since 2012, and in 2015, they 
were completely removed from policy planning. In fact, most of the policies are addressing 
the issues of over-capacity, project maintenance, subsidy payment and grid connections. In 
the solar energy sector, although the quantitative target remains (17.8GW in 2015), the 
policy objective has been shifted to focus on promoting the distributed solar system instead 
of the large-scale grid-connected solar farms. For example, new policies prescribed a ceiling 
capacity for each province to develop large-scale solar farms, and some provinces with 
severe curtailments are no longer allowed to initiate new facilities, unless they are distributed 
and the produced energy can be locally consumed (NEA 2013b, 2015b).  
 
In a more recent policy, the NDRC, as the NEA’s parent institution, requires all the local 
provinces to work out a detailed plan to accommodate and consume locally produced 
renewable energies and avoid long-term transmission (NDRC 2015b). In 2016, the NEA also 
issued a new policy to guarantee the priority of renewable energies to be fully purchased 
and connected (NEA 2016). These policies convey a strong message of a paradigm shift to 
focus more on the actual difficulties of renewable energy generation and consumption, as 
one officer from the NEA reveals during the interviews that such difficulties are most likely to 
affect the competitiveness of renewable energy compared to other energy sources. 
 
Previously it was generally accepted that a bigger market share meant stronger 
industry and bargaining power in the energy system. Such a concept needs to be 
changed now because if the capacities cannot be turned into consumable electricity, 
then the whole (renewable) industry will become an easy target for criticism of 
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wasting resources and lacking an actual contribution to the national low-carbon 
transformation. If such an understanding prevails, renewable energy will lose its core 
competitiveness. 
(Interviewee no. 10, December 2015) 
 
The need to shift the policy paradigm to address the increasing problems of wind and solar 
curtailments can be viewed as the internal driver for policy change. One of the solutions to 
solve the over-capacities and curtailment crisis is to promote the distributed renewable 
energy generation system as a major deviation from previous policy emphasis on grid-
connected large-scale wind and solar farms. Regulators have welcomed this approach. 
Since 2014, several important policies were issued to show the NEA’s determination to 
promote the distributed renewable energy system as the main area for policy support (NEA 
2014b, 2015b). While trying to slow down the development pace of grid-connected wind and 
solar farms in areas where curtailments are rampant, central regulators are openly 
encouraging distributed systems. More favourable subsidy programmes were launched and 
ambitious targets were announced. However, these policy efforts received very limited 
sympathy from business communities and local governments. In 2014, the NEA announced 
an ambitious target of 8GW of distributed solar energy capacity to be installed, with only 
around 2GW actually installed. It is believed that this figure may be exaggerated (China 
Energy News 2015).  
 
The reason why the distributed system cannot be as swiftly expanded as previously grid-
connected wind and solar farms is mainly because the economic return for the distributed 
system is very limited and uncertain. Not only is the overall size of each distributed project 
considerably smaller, but there are also high transaction costs associated with ‘rooftop’ solar 
systems or small-scale projects. For example, the ownership of the rooftop and revenue-
sharing mechanism for large apartment buildings, the complicated financial model, and 
connection difficulties are major concerns that frustrate many investors. One small factory 
owner in Hebei expressed his disappointment during the interview and explained how his 
enthusiasm for the rooftop solar system finally wore out. 
 
We thought it was a good idea [rooftop solar energy system] because the subsidy 
seems to be lucrative and we are a heavy energy user. But once we talked to the 
local grid companies, their managers were not at all interested and were trying to 
push us away or simply not responding to our requests. Then it was the banks. We 
went to several banks to talk about the possible financial arrangement. Again no 
response. We had to give it up. 
(Interviewee no. 6, August 2015)  
 
Banks, grid companies and local governments were previously united under the banner of 
renewable energy development for instrumental interests. But now these interests cannot be 
delivered by distributional systems. Consequently the indifference and uncooperative 
attitude of these entities is undermining the progress of the market, even though it has 
strong support from the central regulators. Local ‘street-level bureaucrats’ are effectively 
deterring favourable policies because they see no benefits in implementing them. The policy 
paradigm shift from a capacity-led development pattern to a more distributed and flexible 
system is consequently a highly contested one. Some actors such as local governments are 
reluctant to accept the changing policy priority and have shifted their attitude towards 
renewables as explained in previous sections. Another factor that drives local officers to 
support fossil fuel sectors are social stability concerns – there is a massive workforce that 
will need to be downsized due to the energy over-supply. The 13th Five-Year Plan estimated 
that more than 1.5 million workers in the coal industry would be made redundant between 
2016 and 2018. In order to make this transition less painful, many local governments are 
trying to enhance the performance of thermal power stations to avoid a drastic shut-down of 
coal production. This would also put renewable energy in a disadvantaged position as social 
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stability is the paramount political priority for the Chinese Communist Party and its officials at 
all levels.    
 
But local officers are not the only group to shy away from the distributed system. It has been 
particularly difficult to get financial support from lending institutions for distributed solar 
systems. The grid companies, who once declared their dedicated support for renewable 
energy development, are also found to lack the incentive to address the local energy 
consumption and accommodation challenges presented by the distributed system as 
requested by the NEA and other central entities. Local government, financial institutions and 
grid companies are typical peripheral actors in China’s renewable energy subsystem who 
have gained tremendous power in the wake of the external economic shocks. This is largely 
because these actors by nature cut across various energy subsystems and governance 
structures. With the various energy sources competing with each other for local support, 
financial loans and priority connection to the grid, these actors have become crucial 
gatekeepers. In fact, most of these actors never give preferential treatment to renewable 
energy projects. Although most local governments showed great enthusiasm for attracting 
and supporting renewable energy investment, it is believed that other forms of investment 
are equally supported due to the entrepreneurial nature of local government in China 
(Dickson 2008; Oi 1995). As for the banks, interviews with project investors suggested that 
they are not getting discounted financial loans from banks for renewable energy projects. 
Crucial lending criteria such as the interest rate, tenure of the loan and collaterals are the 
same as for other energy projects.  
 
The grid companies have the most ambivalent attitude. They have had a long and 
complicated relationship with the renewable energy policy community in the past decade. 
However, once thermal energy suppliers faced a surplus, they started to lobby the grid 
companies to maintain their priority connection to the grid. On the surface, it seems that the 
grid companies are trying to keep a balance between renewable energy and fossil fuel 
energy, because the provinces that experienced the most severe curtailments on renewable 
energy production are simultaneously seeing significant reductions of thermal power outputs. 
This suggests that grid companies are reluctant to prioritise either energy source and are 
currently attempting to strike a balance. However, under the Renewable Energy Law and 
other NEA policies, renewable energy should be given priority. The grid companies have 
already violated many regulatory requirements with this practice, which demonstrates both 
where their preferences lie and their ability to deter policies.  
6.2 The rise of new political spaces 
The previous section argues that the coalition that was organised around instrumental 
interests is falling apart, making the outlook for the paradigm shift uncertain. In addition, the 
old political spaces that once allowed peaceful development of renewable energies are 
diminishing due to intensifying competition from other energy sources. However, there are 
notable new political spaces emerging for renewable energy development. As a nascent 
policy subsystem, renewable energy needs to attract powerful peripheral actors by offering 
the possibility of meeting pragmatic or instrumental interests. This approach, described as 
an interests-bundling process by some researchers, is believed to be the major reason for a 
booming market and installed wind and solar capacity in the past decade (Harrison and 
Kostka 2013).  
 
But the side effects of the approach of over-emphasising the economic purposes of 
renewable energy development in the past decade have also become obvious over the past 
few years, with the frequent curtailments and severe subsidy shortages. Perhaps the most 
serious side effect has been that renewable energy’s unique contribution to decarbonise 
China’s energy system has been downplayed.  
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Addressing the climate change crisis is the ultimate premise to develop renewable energy 
industries. Decarbonisation is the fundamental rationale for designing a proper government 
subsidy system and a supportive policy mix to help the renewable industries compete with 
fossil fuel industries. But in the previous decade, without direct confrontation or competition 
from the fossil fuel incumbents in China, low-carbon ideologies and beliefs have played a 
very limited role in promoting renewable energy development. However, in the new era 
where energy shortages are no longer the biggest challenge for China’s energy system, the 
top priority for energy policies will be shifted to the task of decarbonisation, hence opening 
up new political spaces for renewables to grow in the future. Yet, it should be noted that in 
China renewable energy is not the only segment that is claiming a clean energy label. Other 
non-fossil fuel energy segments such as nuclear power are also highlighting their 
contribution towards decarbonising the energy system by providing clean energy sources 
(State Council 2015; China Daily 2016). Consequently, how to maintain the ‘moral high 
ground’ is an urgent task for renewable energies. The future development of renewable 
energy, as the smallest segment in the current energy mix, largely depends on the solidarity 
of core values among the key public and private policy actors, rather than the instrumental 
interests that once played a vital role in the previous era. 
 
The 13th Five-Year Plan published in March 2016 has sent some positive signals about this 
transformation, claiming as it does that building up a clean and low-carbon energy system is 
a top priority between 2016 and 2020. It also announced that the previous core conflict 
between energy shortage and economic development has been largely resolved, and in the 
next stage of energy modernisation the core conflict is becoming the low-emission and high-
emission energy segments. Such a statement indicates that at least top state regulators in 
Beijing have realised a new era has begun and that there is a need for a paradigm shift to 
decarbonise China’s energy system. The challenge, however, is to nurture these beliefs 
among a wide range of stakeholders that might be reluctant to change the current paradigm 
– a much more complicated task than combining instrumental interests.    
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7 Conclusion 
 
This report has investigated the rise of a new policy paradigm in China’s renewable energy 
sectors. It firstly presents the institutional arrangements and decision-making processes in 
the previous era, which are characterised by a vertically and horizontally connected policy 
coalition comprised of a wide range of central, local, private and public actors. At that time, 
promoting renewable energy production capacity in the national energy mix was the top 
policy priority as it accorded with coalition members’ various instrumental interests. The 
economic returns or instrumental benefits of renewable energy investment attracted local 
governments, financial institutions and grid companies to support the newly emergent 
energy segment. This strategy created a tremendous push of renewable energy activities 
across the country, making China the largest investor in renewable energy production since 
2010 (IEA 2015).  
 
Yet the era of capacity expansion came to an end due largely to a series of exogenous 
factors and internal struggles, resulting in notable policy changes. Since 2014, when faced 
with a sudden economic slowdown and withering energy demand, the policy priority in the 
renewable energy sector shifted from pursuing renewable capacity expansion to dealing with 
over-capacity and curtailment problems. However, such policy changes have not been fully 
welcomed by local governments, banks and grid companies. These actors are withdrawing 
their support from renewable energies as the instrumental interests brought by the 
renewable investments appear to be waning. The split among the previous coalition is 
fundamental, as the instrumental benefits that once drove spectacular growth in China’s 
renewable energy sectors no longer hold the coalition together.  
 
The new era of China’s renewable energy development therefore requires a paradigm shift 
to address the problems from the previous era and focus on the value system that can open 
up new political spaces by tackling climate change, air pollution and energy security 
challenges in China. This paradigm shift replaces the previous policy priority that centred on 
instrumental interests or short-term benefits and it will help renewable energies to survive 
the challenges from other energy sources including nuclear, thermal and hydro power 
stations. The recent policy before and after the 13th Five-Year Plan has already 
demonstrated the intention to prioritise renewable energy’s low-carbon benefits, but 
promoting and synergising decarbonisation values among policy and private actors will be a 
much more difficult task than the ‘interests-bundling’ process (Harrison and Kostka 2013). 
Whether and how the renewable energy sector can continuously grow and contribute 
substantially to reaching the non-fossil fuel targets in China’s energy mix (15 per cent in 
2020 and 20 per cent in 2030), remains contentious at present.   
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